Connect with us

NEWS

Vendor Controllers Left Europe’s Supermarket Fridges Open to Hackers

Supermarket fridge hacks hit seven European countries through vendor cooling controllers, after France named Iran for the October strike on more than 700 stores.

Published

on

A second wave of supermarket fridge hacks hit chains in seven European countries on 2 November, walking in through cooling controllers the stores did not run themselves. Freezers in some shops were driven to 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit). Staff threw out chilled and frozen stock.

France has since named Iran’s Revolutionary Guards for the October strike that hit more than 700 French sites. The 2 November outages still have no public culprit. The door on both nights was the same class of remote fridge plant.

Freezers Jumped to 50 Degrees in Seven Countries

The overnight disruption reached Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Ireland, Estonia, Finland and the Netherlands. Shoppers found empty freezer bays. In a few stores the cabinets themselves were warm to the touch.

At an ICA franchise in Stockholm, sales manager Engla Ingwall said the attack landed at 2 a.m. and was only noticed hours later. “Everything is destroyed,” she said. “There has been a cyberattack and all our freezers reached 50 degrees (Celsius).”

ICA press manager Mattias Elander Forsgren later put the Swedish group’s tally at 23 stores, with eight of them forced to dump chilled and frozen food. He said the group’s own central systems were untouched. Fellow Swedish chain Coop, through press officer Carlos Cancino, confirmed six of its more than 800 stores. Cancino said the problem was resolved and that the hit shops sat on a 4G mobile link rather than the chain’s newer 5G setup, which made them more exposed. In one Coop case the plant began to generate heat.

THE 2 NOVEMBER STORE TALLY

Chain Country Stores hit Company line
Delhaize Belgium and Luxembourg Several dozen, including four in Luxembourg Fresh and frozen range temporarily limited; depots normal
Carrefour Belgium 15 of more than 700 Impact extremely limited; no hypermarkets
Colruyt (Spar franchise) Belgium 5 shops Fridge systems attacked; Colruyt’s own stores spared
ICA Sweden 23 stores, 8 dumped stock External supplier, outside the central network
Coop Sweden 6 of more than 800 Cyber incident on 4G-linked plant; now resolved
SuperValu (Musgrave) Ireland 13 stores Chilled and frozen goods pulled as a precaution
IKEA Mons Belgium 1 store Fridge and freezer units hit; store stayed open

Carrefour Belgium spokesman Mich Vergauwen did not hedge. “It’s a cyberattack, there is no other reason,” he said. A Selver outlet in Estonia and a few Kesko K Group shops in Finland reported temperature faults on the same night. Danfoss told Dutch outlets that 17 facilities in the Netherlands, mostly small grocers and butcher shops, used its systems and were caught in the sweep.

The Weak Point Sat Outside the Store Network

ICA’s wording is the tell. The affected shops used an external supplier, and their cooling kit connected outside ICA’s centrally managed store network. Two of those shops named Danfoss as the fridge vendor. Cancino, for Coop, said the way in was a technical connection and that Danfoss products were not involved in Coop’s cases.

That split matters. The common thread is not one supermarket IT department. It is the contractor who dials into the plant, often through a 4G router fitted with the pack, and the controller that still answers on the public internet.

Stephan Moelans, chief executive of Belgian refrigeration firm Sabcobel, which runs Delhaize’s cooling, said attackers switched evaporators into defrost mode around midnight. His crews spent the night pulling affected units off the network. After the French attacks in October, Sabcobel had started locking down its sites, but Moelans said about 10 percent were still not secured, and some of those sat in shops hit on 2 November. A software patch, he said, is not enough. The kit needs physical changes.

Michael Ferdinandsen, chief executive of Danish industrial security firm Secomea, put the same gap in plainer words. Retailers cannot drop remote access. They need it for night faults and energy control. They do not always control who is on the other end.

For retailers, the question isn’t whether they need remote connectivity. They absolutely do. The question is whether they have sufficient control over who can access their equipment, what they can reach, and what they’re allowed to do.

Michael Ferdinandsen, CEO, Secomea

John Billow, head of Sweden’s National Cyber Security Centre, said the country has a large number of exposed operational devices and that his agency had already been clear about the need to update or patch them. Sweden’s centre was working several incidents on 2 November. It has not said the Swedish cases share an author with the French ones.

France Already Warned About These Controllers

Three weeks earlier, on the night of 11 to 12 October, the same trick hit French food retail at a much larger scale. Attackers changed defrost settings on supermarket refrigeration controllers at more than 700 sites, according to the French foreign ministry. Temperatures in some cabinets rose from as low as -27C to above 50C. Food spoiled. Fires broke out. France’s CERT-FR later counted at least 15 fires after defrost changes.

Carrefour said 80 of its French supermarkets were hit. Cooperative U chief executive Dominique Schelcher said 80 of his network’s nearly 2,000 stores were targeted. Monoprix said 5 percent of its about 490 stores were affected. Intermarche and E.Leclerc were among the other banners named. The ministry put food and goods losses at tens of millions of euros.

On 12 October, CERT-FR issued alert on remote refrigeration controllers CERTFR-2026-ALE-012. It named Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC series units, plus Copeland and Dixell XWEB supervisors. It said putting a management screen on the public internet goes against good practice. It told operators to pull those interfaces, change default passwords, and let remote access in only through a VPN or a tight allow-list.

Danfoss, speaking after the French night, said most of the hit gear was already out of support. The AK-SM800 was declared end of life in May 2021. The AK-SC355 was phased out in 2016. Those trains no longer get software or security updates. Some current AK-SM800A units were also in the blast, running old firmware. “We are working with affected customers to implement appropriate mitigation measures, including firmware updates where available, stronger network protections and removing direct internet exposure where applicable,” the company said.

Copeland said the weakness sat in a discontinued, end-of-life generation of controllers and that it was working with affected customers. Claroty’s Team82 had already shown, months earlier, that flaws in these families could freeze a controller and defrost the food. CISA had listed Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA issues in May 2025. None of that proves which bug, if any, was used in October. Changing a defrost cycle is a normal admin function. A valid login on an open screen can be enough.

FROM THE FRENCH NIGHT TO THE SECOND WAVE

  1. 11 to 12 October 2026: Attackers change defrost settings on supermarket fridge controllers at more than 700 French sites, spoiling food and starting fires.
  2. 12 October 2026: CERT-FR publishes CERTFR-2026-ALE-012, naming Danfoss, Copeland and Dixell remote controllers and telling operators to pull internet exposure.
  3. 1 to 2 November 2026: A second wave hits stores in seven countries. ICA, Coop, Delhaize, Carrefour Belgium, Spar, SuperValu and others report hot or failed cabinets.
  4. 2 November 2026: Danfoss issues an installer guide covering AK-SM800A, AK-SM800, AK-SM720, AK-SC255 and AK-SC355, telling contractors to identify kit, cut public exposure and move off end-of-life boxes.
  5. 9 November 2026: France attributes the October French campaign to Shahid Kaveh, a cyber unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Paris prosecutors seek international arrest warrants.
  6. 10 November 2026: Iran’s ambassador is received at the French foreign ministry. Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot says Paris will seek EU sanctions and will not rule out undisclosed measures.

The 21 days between the French alert and the 2 November wave were the window in which every installer could have pulled a management port. Many did. Censys later watched internet-exposed Danfoss StoreView panels in France collapse after 12 October. The shops that still answered on 2 November were the remainder.

Paris Named Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

On 9 November, speaking after a G7 meeting in Paris, Barrot said government agencies had identified the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as responsible for the October French attack. He called it the first large-scale cyberattack aimed at sabotage on French soil. The foreign ministry’s written sabotage campaign on more than 700 sites used the same line: the first offensive cyber campaign carried out purely for sabotage on French territory.

Thanks to the remarkable efforts of government agencies, I am able to confirm that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards are responsible for this attack.

Jean-Noel Barrot, French foreign minister, G7 briefing in Paris, 9 November 2026

Paris prosecutor Laure Beccuau said investigators had found a modus operandi that matched Shahid Kaveh, an offensive cyber unit tied to the IRGC’s electronic and cyber centre. She cited the use of Farsi and IP addresses traced to devices in Iran. Her office opened a case against the unit’s head, two deputies, and others still to be named, on charges of organised attacks on data systems and of causing damage dangerous to persons, aggravated because the acts served a foreign power. She asked for international arrest warrants.

CERT-FR’s companion threat note, CERTFR-2026-CTI-009, published the same day, repeats that bundle of indicators and places Shahid Kaveh inside the IRGC’s electronic and cyber centre. The note also records that defrost parameters were set to high temperatures and that fires started in at least 15 cases.

Prosecutors say the October operators entered Danfoss and Dixell controllers through web interfaces, started unlimited defrost cycles, and switched off the temperature alarms that should have tripped when cabinets overheated. That is a maintenance action, not a new piece of malware. No public claim of a ransom has surfaced. No data theft has been described.

On 10 November the ambassador was summoned. Barrot, on France Info, said France would push for European sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, and would take any other steps it judged proportionate, including some it would not announce. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said ministers can take the file at the Foreign Affairs Council on 16 November. “If they are attributed, our response should be stronger,” she said.

France has not officially tied the 2 November pan-European outages to Shahid Kaveh. Sweden’s centre and other national teams have not established that the two waves share infrastructure. The political argument online has been almost entirely about the Iran finding. The quieter fact is that whoever typed the October commands, and whoever typed the November ones, used a screen that should not have been on the public internet.

WHAT WE KNOW

  • October author, per Paris: France attributes the 11 to 12 October French campaign to Shahid Kaveh, affiliated with the IRGC.
  • The method: Remote changes to defrost settings and, in the French case, disabled over-temperature alarms, through management interfaces.
  • The kit: CERT-FR named Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC controllers and Copeland/Dixell XWEB units. ICA’s hit shops used a Danfoss-supplied external link.

WHAT IS UNCONFIRMED

  • The 2 November author: No government has publicly named a group for the seven-country wave.
  • A single campaign: National centres have not confirmed that October and November share the same operators or servers.
  • Which flaw: Published CVEs in these product families exist. CERT-FR has not said a specific CVE was used.

Gérôme Billois, a partner at cybersecurity firm Wavestone, said Shahid Kaveh has been active since 2020 and is better known for water-system attacks in the United States. Easy equipment is the current target, he said. A group with time and backing can move on to water or power next.

What Still Sat on the Open Internet

The shops hit on 2 November were, in large part, the ones that had not finished the work CERT-FR set out on 12 October. ICA’s affected plant sat outside the chain network. Coop’s sat on 4G. Sabcobel’s remaining unsecured tenth was in the blast. End-of-life AK-SM800 and AK-SC355 boxes cannot be patched. They can only be taken off the internet or replaced.

Danfoss’s installer guide for AK-SM and AK-SC units, updated on 2 November, tells contractors to identify which controller is in the plant, cut public exposure, turn on stricter modes where they exist, and migrate AK-SC255, AK-SC355, AK-SM720 and AK-SM800 sites onto the current AK-SM800A line so security updates can continue. That document is an admission that the installer, not the supermarket brand, is the person who can still close the port.

THE STEPS CERT-FR SET IN OCTOBER

  • Pull the screen: Take refrigeration management interfaces off the public internet, including port-forwards on store routers and 4G routers shipped with the plant.
  • Narrow the path: Allow remote access only through a VPN or a strict allow-list, and close sibling services on the same address such as remote-screen and proprietary management ports.
  • Check the plant: Review defrost schedules and temperature set-points, because those are the values an intruder changes.
  • Fix what can still be fixed: Apply current firmware on supported models, rotate default passwords, and replace end-of-life units that will never get another patch.
  • Do not trust a reset: A factory reset is not enough if the box is still vulnerable and still reachable.

US agencies have issued parallel advice on hardening industrial refrigeration and cold-chain systems. Simon Edwards, chief executive of testing lab SE Labs, asked the question the guidance keeps circling: why were the fridges on the internet at all, and reachable without proper passwords? The answer, in franchise shops and contractor-managed packs, is convenience. Night-time faults get fixed from a laptop. Energy set-points get pushed from a desk. The same path runs a defrost cycle until the food cooks.

A Blood Bank Got the Same Defrost Command

On 2 November, the French blood service said temperature and defrost thresholds at cold stores holding blood products had been set “to excessively high levels.” Alarms fired. Technicians pulled the stores off the network before the products were destroyed. Paris has not said that incident is part of the supermarket case. It is the same class of plant: a cold box, a remote supervisor, a defrost value someone can type.

Delhaize told staff and shoppers that several dozen stores had an IT incident on the cooling side, that the range of fresh and frozen products was temporarily limited, and that distribution centres kept running. By 3 November the chain said those shops were fully operational again. SuperValu said its 13 Irish stores had been resolved. ICA was still helping franchisees with logistics, IT security and food-safety guidance after the eight shops that had to dump stock.

No chain has published a full loss figure for 2 November. The French October night is the one with a government number, tens of millions of euros, and a fire count. The second wave was smaller because more of the open screens had already been yanked. The screens that remained were enough to cook freezers in Sjöbo, empty bays in Brussels, and a butcher’s cold room in the Netherlands.

Iran has not issued a detailed public reply to the French finding. Barrot’s sanctions request goes to EU ministers on 16 November. The 2 November shops, and every contractor still exposing an AK-SM or XWEB panel, do not need that vote to close a port.

Harry is the editor of SOMALI UPDATE, an independent title he owns and runs. Ten years in journalism, from reporter to editor, have settled into a set of verification habits he applies to every story. A quote is checked against the recording or transcript it came from. A statement attributed to an organisation is confirmed on that organisation's own channels before it is repeated. A figure is traced to the dataset or filing that first published it, and a photograph is checked for when and where it was actually taken. If any of those checks fails, the claim is left out or clearly marked as unconfirmed. Those habits cover the whole site, which reports news, business, technology, science and sports along with entertainment, lifestyle, travel, auto and gaming for readers around the world. Product claims in the technology, auto and gaming pages are tested in use where Harry can get his hands on the product. Corrections are published under a public policy and noted on the article. Readers who want to question a fact can write to support@somaliupdate.com.

Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Trending